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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ERIN JO CHAMBERS, : 
Plaintiff, Appellant : 
and Cross-Appellee, 
v. Case No. 940210-CA 
: Priority No. 15 
THOMAS D. CHAMBERS, 
Defendant, Appellee 
and Cross-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals of the State of Utah has 
jurisdiction to review all final judgments and orders of 
the District Court involving domestic relations cases 
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953, 
as amended) and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE PERMITTED AN 
ADDITIONAL HEARING TO CONSIDER THE ISSUES ON REMAND. 
THERE WAS NO REASONABLE BASIS TO REDUCE THE AMOUNT OF 
ALIMONY PREVIOUSLY AWARDED TO MRS. CHAMBERS. IF A 
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reduced from $5,000.00 to $3,000.00 per month and then 
only terminate upon the occurrence of remarriage, death 
or operation of law. The original Decree terminated 
alimony entirely at the conclusion of six years. 
On September 15f 1993, the parties' counsel met with 
the Court requesting additional clarification regarding 
the effective date of the reduction of alimony. 
Mr. Chambers was contending that the reduction should be 
retroactive to the original Decree date, thereby 
entitling him to a refund. The Court took that matter 
under advisement and issued a supplemental Memorandum on 
November 19, 1993, establishing the effective date as of 
the July 9, 1993 Memorandum Decision. 
The defendant thereafter filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration/Rehearing which was heard on 
February 28, 1994 and denied. At that hearing, the Court 
agreed that it would sign plaintiff's proposed Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on Remand which 
were in fact signed on March 2, 1994. 
Mr. Chambers filed his appeal on March 29, 1994 and 
Mrs. Chambers filed her cross-appeal on April 7, 1994. 
III. DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT. 
The relevant portions of the Court's Order on Remand 
-4-
which form the basis of the issues on appeal and cross-
appeal are: 
A. The Court reduced Mrs. Chambers' alimony 
from $10,000.00 per month to $7,000.00 per month 
effective with the Court's Memorandum Decision dated 
July 12, 1993, which was to continue for the balance of 
the original three-year rehabilitative period. 
B. Beginning with the fourth year, the alimony 
was to be reduced from the original $5,000.00 per month 
amount to $3,000.00 per month. 
C. The alimony would only terminate upon the 
occurrence of remarriage, death or operation of law, 
rather than at the end of six years as originally 
ordered. 
D. The $10,000.00 attorney fee award made at 
the time of trial was affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the original trial, the parties stipulated that 
Mr. Chambers would pay $1,500.00 per month per child for 
the three minor child or a total of $4,500.00 per month 
child support. (T - Vol. IV pp. 52, 53) 
The Court ordered Mr. Chambers to pay alimony in the 
sum of $10,000.00 per month for three years commencing 
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November 1, 1990 and $5,000.00 per month thereafter for 
three years commencing November 1, 1993. The alimony was 
then ordered to cease at the conclusion of the six-year 
period or earlier if the plaintiff died, remarried or 
cohabited. (R - 394) The Court further required 
Mr. Chambers to pay $10,000.00 to assist Mrs. Chambers in 
the payment of her attorney fees in addition to those 
sums he had already paid to assist her in the preparation 
and prosecution of the divorce. (R - 396) 
Mrs. Chambers appealed the amount of alimony awarded 
her, its automatic reduction after three years and its 
termination after six years. She also appealed the 
Court's partial reimbursement of the attorney fees 
incurred by her. 
Mr. Chambers appealed the award of alimony in its 
entirety and the award of attorney fees. 
This Court's decision in Chambers v. Chambers, 
840 P.2d 841 (Utah App. 1992), reversed and remanded in 
part and affirmed in part. With respect to alimony, the 
trial Court was instructed to: 
1. Make further findings to address 
Mrs. Chambers' level of education, health and other 
matters concerning her immediate or eventual 
employability. 
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2. Further articulate the automatic reduction 
of alimony based on the "substantial income from assets 
that have been awarded to (Mrs. Chambers)". 
3. Explain why Mr. Chambers has the ability to 
pay. 
4. Reconsider the Court's apparent inclusion of 
children's expenses in the alimony award and to adjust 
child support if necessary to cover their expenses. 
With respect to attorney fees, the trial Court was 
instructed to: 
1. Consider the partial reimbursement of 
plaintiff's attorney fees based on the standards 
announced in Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1991) . 
After remand, Mr. Chambers filed a Memorandum on 
Remand contending that sufficient evidence existed in the 
record to support supplemental findings and that 
additional evidence would not be necessary. Mr. Chambers 
also submitted proposed Supplemental Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Amended Decree of Divorce NUNC PRO 
TUNC to November 30, 1990.1 
1
 Defendant's Memorandum on Remand has not been paginated by 
the court clerk. It is in the trial record in a bound volume and 
was filed with the District Court of Weber County on 
January 20, 1993. Mr. Chambers' proposed Supplemental Findings of 
Fact and Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc do appear in the record. 
(R - pp. 967-975) 
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Mrs. Chambers filed a remand response Memorandum.2 
Mr. Chambers filed a reply to Mrs. Chambers 
response. (R - 703-711) 
A hearing was conducted on June 7, 1993.3 No 
evidence was taken at this hearing. The Court merely 
heard argument of counsel concerning their respective 
positions. 
It was the opinion of Mr. Chambers' that the trial 
record was complete in every material respect relevant to 
the Court of Appeals' Order on Remand and the trial Court 
could merely supplement its findings based on the record 
already in existence. (T - 2, 3) 
Mrs. Chambers argued that while some aspects of the 
remand requirements could be adjusted by a review of the 
trial transcript, in order to adequately reconsider 
issues directed by the Court of Appeals, some further 
evidence would be necessary to conform to those remand 
instructions. (T - 19) Specifically, it was contended 
that additional evidence would be necessary concerning 
her attorney fees to cure any deficiency that might have 
2
 It was not until the preparation of this Brief that 
Mrs. Chambers' counsel discovered that her original remand response 
Memorandum was not contained in the Court's file. 
3
 All references to the transcript of this hearing are to 
page numbers utilized by the court reporter. It has not otherwise 
been paginated by the court clerk. 
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existed in the record since it was the Court's suggestion 
that evidence would not be necessary at the time of 
trial. (T - 26-28) 
Mrs. Chambers' also pointed out that her needs and 
expenses concerning her gross alimony award were premised 
at trial upon her ability to be successful in a property 
award of Mr. Chambers' future value in his basketball 
contract and absent that, her alimony award request 
needed to be supplemented to take into account other 
aspects of her standard of living that were not 
articulated in her trial exhibit number 11, i.e. 
investments and retirement accounts and benefits.4 She 
asked the Court to permit additional evidence to 
articulate those needs. (T - 30-32) 
It was also contended by Mrs. Chambers' that the 
recent case of Godfrey v. Godfrey, 854 P.2d 585 (Utah 
App. 1993), required the trial Court to equalize the 
post-divorce standard of living. Godfrey quoted Chambers 
v. Chambers as authority. Mrs. Chambers argued that the 
trial Court had failed to do this in the original 
decision. Mrs. Chambers further claimed that her exhibit 
11 was nothing more than her bare living necessities for 
4
 An issue in the original appeal was whether or not 
Mr. Chambers' future value in his basketball contract was a marital 
asset. The Court of Appeals held it was not. 
-9-
the six-month period of separation preceding the divorce 
and that to fashion an award that would equalize post-
divorce standards of living, would require additional 
testimony. (T - 33, 34) 
The Court of Appeals in Chambers v. Chambers, supra, 
had suggested that upon remand, the District Court: 
Must reconsider its apparent inclusion 
of the children's expenses in 
Mrs. Chambers' alimony award. In its 
findings, the Court acknowledges that 
many of the expenses listed in 
Mrs. Chambers' request for $10,000.00 
per month alimony were expenses that 
applied to the children. In view of the 
District Court's award of $4,500.00 per 
month in child support, it is plainly 
inequitable that Mr. Chambers' alimony 
payment includes the children's expenses. 
If the child support that the parties 
stipulated to is insufficient to cover 
the children's expenses, then the Court 
must award sufficient child support, not 
increase alimony to include the children's 
expenses. (See footnote 1 to Decision) 
At this initial remand hearing, Mrs. Chambers also 
requested that the Court permit a brief hearing so she 
could explain her exhibit of needs and list of expenses 
and respond to what the Court of Appeals felt had been 
overlapped alimony and child support.5 (T - 34-36) 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court said: 
5
 Mr. Chambers' Memorandum on Remand contained an analysis of 
what he believed were overlapped expenses for the children and 
Mrs. Chambers. If that analysis were accepted, the child support 
should have been increased. 
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I don't see the necessity for the 
retrial of the case. I think that the 
Court has heard the evidence and the 
record is available to me. And I 
believe that the Court is able to 
follow the directions of the Court of 
Appeals in handing down a new Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree 
relating specifically to the three 
issues: alimony, attorney fees and 
the division of the retirement. 
(T - 54, 55)6 
The Court issued its Memorandum Decision on 
July 12, 1993. With respect to the issue of alimony, the 
Court said: 
In reconsidering the alimony award 
in the original decree, it occurs to 
me that there were miscalculations. I 
found that plaintiff's exhibit 11 
correctly reflected the needs of the 
plaintiff and her children at about 
$10,000 per month. That amount fails 
to consider her additional need of 
health and accident insurance 
(previously provided by the defendant) 
and money to offset her tax liability 
for her receipt of alimony. I 
recognized that there were substantial 
children's expenses involved in the 
exhibit 11 needs assessment, but felt 
that the child support nearly equaled 
the amount of children's expense alleged 
on exhibit 11 and the $4,500 child 
support was included in the income 
calculations. 
In recalculating the alimony, if we 
accept the expenses of exhibit 11 and 
add the expense of health and accident 
insurance and taxes on the alimony 
paid, and then deduct the child support, 
6
 The parties have not re-appealed the issue of retirement. 
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that means the plaintiff has need of 
about $7,000 to maintain her prior 
standard of living. 
This ruling does not factor in any 
consideration of the plaintiffs 
ability to provide for herself or 
money received as returns on 
investments from assets awarded as a 
part of the property division. It is 
the intent of the Court that the 
plaintiff should have the initial three 
years as a rehabilitative period to: 
marshall her assets, learns to invest 
appropriately, make decisions about her 
future, prepare for future employment, 
become settled, etc. Thereafter, the 
Court adopts as its finding, paragraphs 
10 and 11 from the Defendant's 
Supplemental Findings of Fact, etc. 
relating to the plaintiffs ability to 
care for herself, and based upon that 
finding, imputes income to the plaintiff 
of $736 per month. 
The plaintiff received as her share of 
the property division $1,479,578. 
Realistically, it would not be fair to 
consider that figure as her investment 
base. There are obviously attorneys' 
fees and costs of the proceeding, as 
well as taxes to pay, etc. She has 
also requested that we deduct from her 
investment base her purchase of a home 
and the debt by her family. It would 
not be appropriate to allow the plaintiff 
to remove the home from her investment 
base and also allow her to claim rent 
expense of over $1,000 per month. 
Figuring a 4% return on her investment 
base, the imputed income of $736, and 
the child support, the alimony award 
should be reduced at the end of three 
years to $3,000 per month. 
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I had previously ordered termination of 
alimony at the end of three years. That 
decision was based on the fact that when 
the defendant is through with basketball, 
his ability to produce income is frankly 
no better than the plaintiffs. His 
present earning ability is based strictly 
upon his status as a professional athlete. 
In retrospect, that is not entirely 
correct, for it fails to consider the 
income he will earn in the meantime. His 
investment base, considering his interim 
income, should exceed hers by several 
times, giving him by far a superior 
ability to provide on-going assistance. 
The alimony then should not terminate 
except upon the occurrence of remarriage, 
death, etc. (R - 732-734) 
With respect to the issue of attorney fees, the 
Court said: 
The final issue requiring consideration 
is that of the attorneys' fee award. 
The stipulation at trial, as the court 
understood it, was that if Mr. Dolowitz 
were called to testify, he would verify 
the material contained in plaintiff's 
exhibit 17 and express the opinion that 
the time and costs involved were 
reasonable taking into account the 
complexity and seriousness of the issues 
involved. The defendant did not 
stipulate the charges or time were 
reasonable, but only that would be 
Mr. Dolowitz's testimony. 
The exhibit (17) contained a summary 
sheet of the gross charges, a breakdown 
of the hourly rate of persons from 
Mr. Dolowitz's office working upon the 
plaintiff's case, a monthly summary 
of charges, times and persons, and 
finally a day-by-day account of date, 
-13-
attorney, service description, hours 
and charge (amount). In considering 
the complexity of the issues, the 
number of hearings, the conferences, 
the resolution of issues, the 
animosity between the parties, the 
amounts of money and property, etc., 
the Court believes the charges were 
not unreasonable. 
The second issue relates to the fact 
that the defendant with a multiple 
million dollar income clearly has 
the ability to assist the plaintiff 
with her attorneys fees. In fact, in 
a comparison of the resources of the 
two parties, he is in a much superior 
position. 
The final prong of the "Bell" (810 
P.2d 489) analysis relates to the 
ability of the plaintiff to pay her 
own attorneys' fees. It is clear 
with the distribution of almost a 
million and a half dollars in assets, 
that the plaintiff could pay her own 
attorney. However, the Court was 
concerned about the necessity of her 
being able to maintain an appropriate 
investment base. I was aware that 
there would be substantial inroads 
into that base by reason of taxes, 
the debt owed by her family (which 
is likely uncollectible), court 
costs, witness' fees, attorneys' 
fees, etc. In the interest of her 
being able to maintain a base 
sufficient to provide an appropriate 
income, I felt she needed some 
assistance with the fees. I ruled 
the attorneys' fees previously paid, 
have been paid with marital assets 
not to be considered in the final 
distribution, and awarded her an 
additional $10,000 to apply to her 
attorneys' fees. Based upon the 
-14-
above considerations, I find that 
the plaintiff has need of assistance 
with her attorneys' fees. (R - 734-736) 
The parties' counsel met with the Court on 
September 15, 1993 requesting additional clarification 
regarding the effective date of the reduction of alimony. 
The Court took that matter under advisement and issued a 
Supplemental Memorandum on November 19, 1993. In the 
Supplemental Memorandum, the Court said: 
In the Court's reconsideration of 
alimony in response to an order of 
the appellate Court, I had failed 
to specify disposition of the 
overpayment from the time of the 
original decree to the time of the 
order of the Court of Appeals. 
Upon reflection, that failure may 
have been a result of a subconscious 
desire to not address the issue in 
hopes it would go away. 
To require the plaintiff to repay 
those overpayments would seriously 
affect her ability to maintain her 
standard of living. 
It would undermine further her 
investment base to a very serious 
extent. In addition, in dividing 
the estate, we had awarded to her 
an obligation of her family which 
at this point seems unlikely to be 
collected. The decision to loan the 
money to the plaintiff's brother 
appears to have been a joint decision. 
The diminution of her estate by both 
the loan and repayment of alimony 
based upon the Court's mistake, 
somehow seems unfair. 
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The Court accordingly declines to 
order repayment based upon the 
equities of property division, 
earning ability, etc. (R - 766-767) 
Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order on Remand were prepared. Mr. Chambers filed a 
Motion for Reconsideration/Rehearing. A hearing was 
conducted February 28, 1994. No evidence was taken, but 
the Court heard argument of counsel.7 At that hearing, 
Mr. Chambers' counsel argued that there was no evidence 
in the record to consider Mrs. Chambers' standard of 
living that would justify the Court failing to order her 
to repay the overpayment of alimony. (T - 5) 
Mr. Chambers' counsel also argued there was no evidence 
in the record that would justify extending the alimony 
beyond the original six-year period. (T - 13) 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court stated: 
The whole basis for the court's 
decision concerning the pay-back 
issue is one of equity. While I 
recognize that there's some real 
justice in what you have suggested, 
it all comes back to the issue of 
what's really fair. And that's 
where I kept getting hung up. 
Frankly, Mr. Florence, if you feel 
that the concept of retroactivity 
is more defensible, I think based 
7
 All references to the transcript of this hearing are to 
page numbers utilized by the court reporter. It has not otherwise 
been paginated by the court clerk. 
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upon the Court's previous finding — 
and I'll be candid. I hadn't 
considered — even thought about that. 
I guess I presumed that it would be 
required of the Court to make a 
ruling concerning whether she has to 
pay it back or not. I don't think 
I'd considered the possibility of 
just saying it's not retroactive, 
although I guess the net effect of 
saying she doesn't have to pay it 
back is that it not be retroactive. 
If you feel that's a more defensible 
position, I have no objection to 
making a specific finding that it 
isn't retroactive. 
And I recognize the justice of what 
you're saying, but we're not dealing 
with a contract matter where somebody 
has borrowed money from somebody else 
and now they don't have to pay it 
back. We're dealing with the division 
of assets and with standards of living 
in a divorce action which is a whole 
different ball game. 
And while I have some sympathy for, 
you know, the plea that you've made, 
it just doesn't seem fair. Just 
doesn't seem fair. 
If you want me, Mr. Florence, to make 
specific findings as you've previously 
proposed or if you'd like to redo 
findings concerning that specific 
aspect of retroactivity, I'll be glad 
to consider it either way. (T - 34-36) 
The Court agreed to sign the proposed Findings, 
Conclusions and Order on Remand previously submitted by 
Mrs. Chambers' counsel. (T - 39) They were in fact 
signed on March 2, 1994. (R - 921-932) 
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From these Decisions, both parties have filed their 
appeals. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
To better address the issues on remand, the trial 
Court should have conducted a brief evidentiary hearing. 
The Court's Order on Remand arbitrarily reduced the prior 
award of alimony. If any change in the original Decree 
was justified, the alimony should have been increased. 
Mrs. Chambers' original request for alimony was premised 
upon her belief that she would receive as part of her 
property settlement a portion of the value of 
Mr. Chambers' future basketball contract. Absent that, 
her request for alimony needed to be increased. When the 
trial Court and Court of Appeals rejected her claim for 
an interest in the basketball contract, the Court should 
have considered her additional needs not covered by her 
alimony request at trial. 
The reduction of alimony for the first three years 
was not based on any facts. The Court apparently erred 
in its math. The reduction of alimony after three years 
was also without any factual basis and failed to even 
come close to maintaining Mrs. Chambers' marital standard 
of living or equalizing the post-divorce standards of 
living. 
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Since the Court reduced her alimony, presumably on 
the basis that the other assets awarded her would assist 
with her needs, it was inappropriate for the trial Court 
to only make a nominal award of attorney fees. If 
attorney fees were justified, there was no articulated 
basis to deny her request for full reimbursement. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE PERMITTED 
AN ADDITIONAL HEARING TO CONSIDER THE 
ISSUES ON REMAND. THERE WAS NO 
REASONABLE BASIS TO REDUCE THE AMOUNT 
OF ALIMONY PREVIOUSLY AWARDED TO 
MRS. CHAMBERS. IF A REDUCTION WAS 
JUSTIFIED, IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE 
TO REQUIRE MRS. CHAMBERS TO REIMBURSE 
MR. CHAMBERS. 
In the original appeal, Mrs. Chambers was arguing 
that the future contract payments for Mr. Chambers to 
play basketball for the Phoenix Suns was a marital asset 
which should be subject to division. The trial Court had 
concluded that the future earnings of Mr. Chambers were 
not a property right subject to division. 
Both at trial and on appeal, Mrs. Chambers urged 
that if the contract payments were not to be divided, 
then the large disparity in the parties' incomes should 
be equitably treated by a larger alimony award. 
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The Court of Appeals in Chambers v. Chambers, 840 
P.2d 841 (Utah App. 1992) , held that Mr. Chambers' future 
contract payments were not marital property rights 
subject to division. (At page 845) With respect to 
alimony, the Court criticized the trial Court's findings 
as being insufficient. The trial Court had awarded 
Mrs. Chambers alimony in the sum of $10,000.00 per month 
which would continue for three years, after which the 
alimony would be reduced to $5,000.00 per month for an 
additional three years, after which it would terminate. 
The Court of Appeals stated that the second prong of 
Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 1989), 
that is the ability of Mrs. Chambers to produce a 
sufficient income for herself, had not been addressed. 
Specifically, Mrs. Chambers' level of education, health 
and other matters concerning her immediate or eventual 
employability, had not been commented upon. 
(At page 843) 
The Court of Appeals also said that the third prong 
of Schindler, that is the ability of the responding 
spouse to provide support, had not been met in as much as 
the Court only stated that: "The defendant has the 
ability to pay". (At page 843) 
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The Court of Appeals further held that the trial 
Court's reliance upon "substantial income from assets 
that have been awarded to her" as justification to reduce 
and subsequently terminate alimony was insufficient 
without further explanation. (At page 843) 
Additionally, by footnote, the Court of Appeals 
said: 
The District Court must reconsider 
its apparent inclusion of the children's 
expenses in Mrs. Chambers' alimony award. 
In its findings, the Court acknowledges 
that many of the expenses listed in 
Mrs. Chambers' request for $10,000.00 
per month alimony were expenses that 
applied to the children. In view of the 
District Court's award of $4,500.00 per 
month in child support, it is plainly 
inequitable that Mr. Chambers' alimony 
payment includes the children's expenses. 
If the child support that the parties 
stipulated to is insufficient to cover 
the children's expenses, then the Court 
must award sufficient child support, not 
increase alimony to include the children's 
expenses. (At page 843) 
Over the objection of Mrs. Chambers, these remand 
requirements were only considered by the trial Court by 
arguments of counsel at the hearing on June 7, 1993. 
With respect to the direction that the Court enter 
additional findings to address Mrs. Chambers' level of 
education, health and other matters concerning her 
immediate or eventual employability, Mrs. Chambers 
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conceded that considerable testimony was received at 
trial concerning her education, health and past 
employment history, but contended that no testimony was 
elicited at trial regarding her future employability. In 
any event, in the Court's Memorandum Decision issued 
July 12, 1993, the Court adopted as its findings 
paragraphs 10 and 11 from defendant's proposed 
Supplemental Findings of Fact, etc. relating to the 
plaintiff's ability to care for herself and based upon 
those findings, imputed income to Mrs. Chambers of 
$736.00 per month. In this regard, the Supplemental 
Findings appear in paragraph 10 of the Court's Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on Remand. 
(R - 925) 
With respect to the requirement that the Court give 
further explanation to justify a reduction of alimony, 
the Court had said in its original Decision that 
Mrs. Chambers would be able to earn substantial income 
from the assets awarded to her and used this as its 
justification for first reducing the alimony after three 
years and then terminating it altogether after six. On 
remand, the Court said that the reduction after three 
years was based on a 4% return on Mrs. Chambers' 
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investment based and the imputed additional income of 
$736.00 per month. After agreeing that the property 
award to Mrs. Chambers should not be totally considered 
her true investment base, the Court made no further 
finding as to what her investment base should be. The 
original decision to terminate alimony altogether was 
based upon the fact that when Mr. Chambers was through 
with basketball, his ability to produce income would be 
no better than the plaintiffs. In retrospect, the trial 
Court concluded that was not entirely correct for it 
failed to consider the income he would earn in the 
meantime which was substantially greater than 
Mrs. Chambers, thereby giving him a far superior ability 
to provide on-going assistance. Accordingly, the Court 
concluded that the alimony should not terminate except 
upon the occurrence of remarriage and death. 
(R - 732-734) 
With respect to the Court of Appeals' direction that 
the trial Court explain why the defendant had the ability 
to payf the Court on remand failed to address this issue 
entirely. What we do know from the original trial was 
that in the first year following the trialf 
Mr. Chambers was to receive $116,667.00 per month gross. 
In the second year, that figure was to increase to 
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$141,667.00 per month gross. In the third year following 
the trial, Mr. Chambers was to receive $166,667.00 per 
month gross. Not taking into account what has in fact 
happened to Mr. Chambers since the divorce trial, the 
contract presented at trial showed that in the fourth 
year following the trial, he would be receiving 
$47,917.00 per month which would continue for the 
remainder of the six-year period. While the Court has 
not specifically made findings that Mr. Chambers had the 
ability to pay the alimony that was ordered, it has 
recently been held in Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d 963 (Utah 
App. 1994), that unstated findings of the Court could be 
implied if it was reasonable to assume that the Court 
actually considered the evidence and necessarily made the 
finding to resolve the controversy, but simply failed to 
record the factual determination that it made. In this 
particular case, there was no disagreement as to what 
Mr. Chambers' gross income was going to be pursuant to 
his contract with the Phoenix Suns and at no time did he 
ever suggest he lacked the ability to pay reasonable 
alimony to Mrs. Chambers. The finding of Mr. Chambers'' 
ability to pay should therefore be implied. 
It is the footnote to Chambers v. Chambers, supra, 
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which caused the trial Court to recalculate alimony and 
is the primary basis for both parties' appeals, 
Mr. Chambers claims that the recalculation should result 
in a refund to him and Mrs. Chambers claims that the 
Court should not have reduced the alimony at all, but 
increased it or increased child support or both. The 
footnote directed the trial Court to reconsider its 
apparent inclusion of children's expenses in 
Mrs. Chambers' alimony award. 
In defendant's Memorandum on Remand, Mr. Chambers 
argued that Mrs. Chambers' exhibit 11 which itemized 
expenses of $9,997.73 per month, was the amount necessary 
to cover her and the children's expenses. Mr. Chambers 
then detailed what he believed to be the children's 
expenses actually implicit in exhibit 11 and concluded 
that $4,783.36 should be attributed to children's 
expenses and $5,214.37 was Mrs. Chambers' net request for 
alimony. If this argument were accepted, child support 
should have been increased when the alimony was 
decreased. 
Mrs. Chambers' trial exhibit 11 is attached as an 
addendum to this Brief. As can be seen, her total 
support request was actually $14,060.00 which included 
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$4,060.60 taxes that would be due on her alimony award of 
$10,000.00 per month. The parties had stipulated to a 
total child support award of $1,500.00 per month per 
child or a total of $4,500.00 and the $10,000.00 alimony 
award originally given by the Court did nothing more than 
meet Mrs. Chambers' requested needs which in fact 
included the needs for the children, but which altogether 
would have justified a total $14,060.00 per month award. 
Mr. Chambers has mis-stated the nature of 
Mrs. Chambers' alimony request. He has persisted in 
suggesting that exhibit 11 was the maximum of her support 
request and was representative of her marital standard of 
living. During her testimony in the original trial, 
after reviewing her exhibit and the expenses listed, this 
exchange occurred: 
Q. Is this— and is there any 
significant difference in the expenses 
set out in Exhibit 11-P and those 
you've spent during the marriage? 
A. Excuse me. Would you— 
Q. Is this the same as you have 
done during the marriage? 
A. No. 
Q. No? In what way is it different? 
A. Well, I used to be able to take 
the kids — we would-during the season 
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we would fly back and forth and Tom 
always paid for those type of things 
and—and with this I could not do that 
now. 
Q. Is this less than the standard of 
living you had during the marriage? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you think this is a reasonable 
request that you're making? 
A. Yes 
Q. Is there any component in Exhibit 
11-P for investing or saving any money? 
A. No 
Q. You—you were here when I addressed 
an opening statement to the Court. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And said that we're dealing with 
the problem of Mr. Chambers' future 
earnings under the present five-year 
contract. 
A. Yes 
Q. If the Court were to determine 
that those represent not property to be 
dividedf but earnings, would you desire 
more than—an alimony higher than 11-P 
in order to deal with investing or putting 
anything aside for yourself? 
A* Yes* 
(Transcript Volume II pages 12 and 13) 
Mr. Chambers went into considerable detail citing 
the record in an effort to show that Mrs. Chamber's 
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stated needs, included expenses for the children. He 
acknowledged that her exhibit for expenses was based "on 
a compilation of actual expenses during a six-month 
period in 1990 just before trial", (page 8) What is 
obviously lacking in this approach and further points to 
the necessity of an evidentiary hearing is that 
Mrs. Chambers' compilation of actual expenses is based on 
what she needed during a period of separation from 
Mr. Chambers, pending the trial, when she was totally 
dependant on him for her needs. It did not reflect in 
any measure, the standard of living the two of them 
enjoyed during the marriage, nor did it attempt to bring 
into any parity their future standard of living. 
For instance, there was no provision in 
Mrs. Chambers' six-month actual living expense analysis 
(Exhibit 11) for her own health insurance needs for the 
future since Mr. Chambers had been paying them; no 
provision for any extended travel or trips, something 
Mr. Chambers could afford and obviously enjoyed himself 
but not calculated for Mrs. Chambers; no provision for 
tax preparation since Mr. Chambers had been paying; no 
ability for her to buy expensive gifts for the children, 
something that only Mr. Chambers has been able to do 
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since the divorce; no provision for Mrs. Chambers to make 
real estate or stock investments, to create a retirement 
plan or savings, something the parties obviously did 
during their marriage but Mrs. Chambers cannot now do. 
The parties stipulated to $4,500.00 per month for 
the child support and the Court ordered $10,000.00 per 
month for alimony which was to reduce to $5,000.00 in 
November, 1993. The Court did nothing more than cover 
Mrs. Chambers' six-month pre-divorce expenses by the 
initial support award. 
In the Court's Memorandum Decision of July 12, 1993, 
it said: 
In recalculating the alimony, if we 
accept the expenses of exhibit 11 
and add the expenses of health and 
accident insurance and taxes on the 
alimony paid and then deduct the 
child support, that means the 
plaintiff has need of about $7,000.00 
to maintain her prior standard of 
living. (R - 733) 
This simply does not add up. If the Court accepts 
the expenses of exhibit 11, adds the expenses of health 
and accident insurance and taxes paid on alimony and 
deducted the $4,500.00 child support, it would still 
justify the original $10,000.00 per month alimony award. 
There is no factual or mathematical basis for the Court 
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to have reduced the alimony to $7,000.00• 
It should also be kept in mind that Mrs. Chambers 
was couching the alimony request stated in exhibit 11 in 
the context of a request for a division of Mr. Chambers' 
future contract earnings. If that were not awarded to 
her, then it was her request that a higher alimony award 
be provided in order to allow her to invest and put aside 
things for herself such as Mr. Chambers would be able to 
do following the trial. As previously stated, exhibit 11 
was nothing more than a compilation of the actual 
expenses incurred by Mrs. Chambers during a six-month 
period in 1990 just before trial. It did not reflect her 
true standard of living while residing with Mr. Chambers. 
It certainly did nothing by way of equalizing post-
divorce standards of living. 
Following the original Chambers decision, this Court 
decided Godfrey v. Godfrey, 854 P.2d 585 (Utah App. 
1993). In Godfrey, the Court held that an alimony award 
should, after a marriage, and to the extent possible, 
equalize the parties' respective standards of living and 
maintain them at a level as close as possible to the 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. Chambers 
was cited as authority for this proposition. (At page 
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589) The trial Court's original $10,000.00 alimony award 
and indeed the reduction to $7,000.00 did not reflect in 
any measure the standard of living the two of them 
enjoyed during the marriage, nor did it attempt to bring 
into any parity their future standard of living. As 
stated above, there was no provision for any extended 
travel or trips for Mrs. Chambers, something Mr. Chambers 
could afford to do, no ability for her to buy expensive 
gifts for the children, no provision to make real estate 
or stock investments or to create a retirement plan or 
savings for herself. In light of the assets that existed 
at the conclusion of the marriage, asset accumulation was 
something the parties were obviously capable of doing 
during the marriage, but which Mrs. Chambers could not 
subsequently do based on the alimony award granted her. 
In fact, the Court was relying on the assets awarded 
Mrs. Chambers as a basis for setting the alimony. 
In short, the trial Court should have increased the 
alimony rather than decreased it and, if anything, should 
have increased the amount of child support since, by 
Mr. Chambers' own analysis, the amount of money being 
expended for the children's needs pursuant to exhibit 11 
exceeded the $4,500.00 per month that was stipulated to 
by the parties. 
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The Court claimed that its new ruling reducing the 
alimony from $10,000.0 to $7,000.00 per month for the 
balance of the first three-year period did not factor in 
any consideration of Mrs. Chambers'' ability to provide 
for herself or the money she received as returns on 
investments from assets awarded her as part of the 
property division. In this regard, the Court said that: 
It is the intent of the Court that the 
plaintiff should have the initial 
three years as a rehabilitative period. 
To: marshall her assets, learn to invest 
appropriately, make decisions about her 
future, prepare for future employment, 
become settled, etc. (R - 733) 
The Court did use her "investment base" and an 
additional imputed income to reduce the alimony after 
three years. The Court of Appeals specifically directed 
the trial Court to articulate any reduction of alimony 
based on assets awarded Mrs. Chambers. 
Mr. Chambers has spent considerable time and detail 
discussing Mrs. Chambers' share of the property division 
totaling $1,479,578.00. The Court realized that 
realistically it would not be fair to consider that 
figure as her investment base (R - 733), but did not 
further articulate what an appropriate investment base 
would be. The Court suggested that a 4% return on an 
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investment base and the imputed income of $736.00 per 
month and the child support justified the further 
reduction of the alimony award to $3,000.00 per month at 
the end of three years. There is no further articulation 
as to how this sum was arrived at or what the true 
investment base would be. This was one of the reasons 
that Mrs. Chambers was urging an additional factual 
hearing to determine the true investment base that was 
income producing. For instance, some of the annuities 
awarded to her have not yet been received because of 
financial difficulties of one of the entities. She has 
been heavily taxed on other annuities actually paid and 
she incurred substantially higher attorney fees and 
expert witness fees than were originally anticipated or 
testified to at the time of trial. She would also have 
a substantial tax obligation on her share of the Seattle 
Supersonics payments awarded to her. 
The Court's decision on remand reducing the sums of 
alimony are not supported by adequate findings. Johnson 
v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 696 (Utah App. 1989). Automatically 
decreasing alimony will not be justified unless specific 
findings are made which would support the automatic 
decrease. Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 
1988). 
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In Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991), 
the defendant was claiming entitlement to a higher 
alimony award because of the disparity in income, length 
of marriage and respective earning abilities. 
The Court said: 
We believe it is consistent with 
the goal of equalizing the parties' 
post-divorce status to look to the 
standard of living existing at or 
near the time of trial in 
determining alimony. This is 
consonant with the treatment of 
both marital property and child 
support and is better designed to 
equip both parties to go forward 
with their separate lives with 
relatively equal odds. . . In 
so holding, we agree with the 
dissenting opinion that 
determining standard of living 
is a "fact sensitive, subjective 
task". We disagree, however, 
that standard of living is 
determined by actual expenses 
alone. Those expenses may be 
necessarily lower than needed 
to maintain the appropriate 
standard of living for various 
reasons, including, possibly 
lack of income. 
The Court went on to say that: 
The post-separation substantial 
increase in plaintiffs income 
was akin to deferred income, 
at 1212. 
Also, in Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P. 2d 538 (Utah 
1991), the Supreme Court, in eliminating the theory of 
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equitable restitution previously announced by the Court 
of Appeals in Martinez, stated that while ordinarily the 
needs of spouses for alimony are assessed in light of the 
standard of living they had during the marriage, "in some 
circumstances, it may be appropriate to try to equalize 
the spouses' respective standards of living". (At 540) 
These cases suggest that if any change in the alimony 
awarded Mrs. Chambers was to occur, it should have been 
increased. Given the substantial differences in income, 
Mrs. Chambers' post-divorce standard of living pales in 
comparison to Mr. Chambers. 
In the event this Court concludes that the trial 
Court was justified in reducing the amount of alimony, it 
would not be appropriate to require Mrs. Chambers to 
reimburse the alimony actually paid by Mr. Chambers while 
the first appeal was pending and that which would have 
been paid by him had Judge Taylor's effective date of the 
reduction been different. In the original Decree, 
Mr. Chambers' $10,000.00 per month alimony requirement 
was to commence on November 1, 1990. In the Court's 
Order on Remand, it reduced the alimony to $7,000.00 per 
month effective with the Court's Memorandum Decision 
dated July 12, 1993. In this regard, the Court has 
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justified its conclusion that the effective date would 
not be retroactive to November 1, 1990. Judge Taylor 
concluded a repayment obligation "would seriously affect 
her ability to maintain her standard of living" and 
"would further undermine her investment base to a very 
serious extent". This is a discretionary right of the 
trial Court. 
In Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065 (Utah App. 
1994) , in considering an excessive attorney fee award, 
this Court held that: 
Trial Court's have considerable 
discretion in determining the 
financial interests of divorced 
parties and that property and 
alimony awards will be upheld on 
appeal unless a clear and 
prejudicial abuse of discretion 
is demonstrated. Citing Hall v. 
Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 
1993; Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 
1072 (Utah 1985); Howell v. Howell, 
806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App.) cert, 
denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). 
The effective date of the reduction of alimony was 
clearly within the Court's discretion. The Court has 
articulated the reason for choosing an effective date 
that would not require retroactive reimbursement. 
If this Court concludes that Judge Taylor 
appropriately reduced the alimony, it would not 
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necessarily require that any retroactive application be 
imposed. There are two ways this could be approached* 
If Judge Taylor considered the remand directions to 
require him to re-visit the issue of alimony consistent 
with those directions, then any subsequent order entered 
by him could be considered as a new order regarding 
alimony and its validity could be tested by normal 
standards of appellate review, i.e. adequate findings 
that do not constitute an abuse of discretion. 
On the other handf if a modified order is to be 
viewed as an overturning decision based on appellate 
order, then the normal considerations that are utilized 
in deciding whether a decision should be applied 
retroactively or prospectively would be followed. 
In that regard, it was stated in Loyal Order of 
Moose No. 259 v. County Bd., 657 P.2d 257 (Utah 1982): 
Ordinarily an overruling decision 
has retroactive operation. State Farm 
Mutual Insurance Company v. Farmers 
Insurance, 27 Utah 2d 166, 493 P.2d 
1002 (1972) (language appears there as 
dicta). Retroactive operation occurs, 
to some degree, whenever a case is 
applied in any manner to control the 
legal consequences flowing from fact 
situations which arose at a point 
earlier than the announcement of the 
new rule. The application may be to 
parties and facts of the case where 
the new rule is announced, to pending 
-37-
cases, to future-initiated cases 
arising from earlier events, or in some 
rare instances to terminated cases 
which are subject to collateral attack... 
Constitutional law neither requires 
nor prohibits retroactive operation 
of an overruling decision. A 
decision's operative effect is 
treated as a function of judicial 
policy rather than judicial power... 
In other words, the extent of the 
decision's application is left to the 
discretion of the court... 
Where overruled law has been 
justifiably relied upon or where 
retroactive operation creates a 
burden, the Court, in its discretion, 
may prohibit retroactive operation of 
the overruling decision. State Farm 
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Farmers 
Insurance, supra. In such instances, 
prospective operation of a court 
decision has long been applied. 
And in Belden v. Dalbo, Inc., 752 P.2d 1317 (Ut. App. 
1988) it was held that whether retroactive application 
should occur depends on whether "a substantial injustice 
would otherwise occur" or whether the prior law "had been 
justifiably relied on or a burden would be created". 
See also VanDvke v. Chappell, 818 P.2d 1023 (Utah 1991, 
whether "retroactive operation of the new law may 
otherwise create an undue burden" (at 1025) and Heslop v. 
Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992) which applied a 
"substantial injustice" standard (at 835). 
-38-
With either approach, the trial Court has discretion 
to decide the effective date and has exercised that 
discretion in this case to prevent an injustice or create 
an unreasonable burden. 
POINT II 
MRS. CHAMBERS SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED 
HER FULL REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES. 
In the original Chambers, supra, the Court of 
Appeals quoted the trial Court's finding with respect to 
attorney fees wherein the Court awarded Mrs. Chambers an 
additional $10,000.00 to be added to the $12,500.00 
already paid by Mr. Chambers to assist in partial 
reimbursement of her estimated $58,050.00 attorney 
fees.8 
The Court of Appeals indicated that the trial Court 
failed to address the reasonableness of the fees and 
stopped short of finding that each party would have the 
means to pay their own fees out of the money being 
distributed to both. Accordingly, the award of partial 
attorney fees was reversed with the direction that the 
trial Court reconsider this issue "under the standards 
announced in Bell". (At page 844) 
8
 This was another area where Mrs. Chambers wanted to present 
additional evidence following remand. Her attorney fees in fact 
ended up in excess of $90,000.00 and her expert witness fees were 
in excess of $45,000.00. 
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The standards announced in Bell v. Bellr 810 P.2d 
489 (Utah App. 1991), require the Court to consider and 
include in the findings factors such as: 
A. The difficulty of the litigation. 
B. The efficiency of the attorneys. 
C. The reasonableness of the number of hours 
spent. 
D. The customary fee and the locality. 
E. The amount involved in the case. 
F. The result attained. 
G. The attorneys' expertise and experience. 
H. To justify an award of the amount claimed. 
At the hearing on June 7, 1993, Mrs. Chambers 
requested the Court to have the opportunity to have her 
trial counsel appear and testify with greater clarity 
concerning the Bell standards. It was suggested, 
however, that her lawyer had prepared an Affidavit with 
his detailed attorney fee request and was prepared to 
testify if necessary. It was the Court that suggested 
that testimony not be taken and that Mr. Chambers' 
counsel accept the Affidavit as to what Mr. Dolowitz 
would testify to if called and then the Court could make 
specific findings concerning the appropriate factors. 
(See trial transcript, volume 2, pp. 160-161; 
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June 7, 1993 hearing pp. 26-28, 56-57•) 
In the Court's July 12, 1993 Memorandum Decision, 
the Court attempted to address each of the Bell 
standards. Although the Court did not articulate them 
one by one, it did comment upon the difficulty of the 
litigation, the amount in controversy and the 
reasonableness of the time and charges incurred. 
(R - 735) 
With respect to Mr. Chambers' ability, the Court 
found that he had a multiple million dollar income and 
resources that put him in a much superior position to 
assist with the fees. (R - 736) 
With respect to needf the Court said: 
It is clear with the distribution of 
almost a million and a half dollars 
in assets, that the plaintiff could 
pay her own attorney. Howeverf the 
Court was concerned about the 
necessity of her being able to 
maintain an appropriate investment 
base. I was aware that there would 
be substantial inroads into that base 
by reason of taxes, the debt owed by 
her family (which is likely 
uncollectible), court costs, witness 
fees, attorney fees, etc. In the 
interest of her being able to maintain 
a base sufficient to provide an 
appropriate income, I felt she needed 
some assistance with the fees . . . 
Based upon the above considerations, 
I find that the plaintiff has need 
of assistance with her attorney fees. 
(R - 735) 
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The issue of attorney fees was argued again at the 
February 28, 1994 hearing. The Court was reminded of the 
language of the July Memorandum Decision and the Court 
declined any further modification or elaboration with 
respect to the issue of attorney fees. (T -36-38) 
Since the assets awarded Mrs. Chambers were to be 
utilized, at least in the Court's mind, to justify the 
amount of the alimony awarded and its reduction after 
three years, the Court was correct in determining that 
she needed assistance with her attorney fees by not 
requiring her to make further inroads on those assets 
awarded to her, thereby depleting her ability to use 
those assets for her own purposes. Mr. Chambers was 
awarded an equal amount of assets, but maintained a 
monthly income several times that which would be 
available to Mrs. Chambers. 
Given these findings, the only real issue should be 
why the full award of attorney fees was not granted. 
As stated in Bell, supra, the Court must justify 
anything less than a full award of attorney fees. This 
was not done. If a partial award of attorney fees is 
granted, the Court must provide a specific finding as to 
why the award was partial. See Haumont v. Haumont, 
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793 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah App. 1990) and Muir v. Muir, 
841 P.2d 736, 741 (Utah App. 1992). 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Mrs. Chambers is requesting attorney fees on appeal. 
Where the trial Court has awarded attorney fees and the 
receiving spouse prevails on the main issues, attorney 
fees are generally awarded on appeal. Believing that she 
should prevail on the issues raised here, Mrs. Chambers 
is requesting reimbursement for the attorney fees 
incurred in the preparation and presentation of this 
appeal. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1027 (Utah App. 
1993); Allred v. Allred, 835 P.2d 974, 979 (Utah App. 
1992); Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d 963, 967 (Utah App. 1994). 
CONCLUSION 
This case should be remanded once again with 
directions to the trial Court to conduct a hearing to 
adequately address the needs and circumstances of 
Mrs. Chambers and to fashion an alimony award that would 
provide her a true and equitable standard of living. At 
a minimum, the previously ordered alimony should be 
restored to her. She should also be awarded her full 
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request for attorney fees. 
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ADDENDUM 
A copy of the Decree of Divorce. 
A copy of the July 12, 1993 Memorandum Decision* 
A copy of the November 19, 1993 Supplemental 
Decision. 
A copy of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order on Remand. 
A copy of plaintiff's trial exhibit 11. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
ERIN JO CHAMBERS, ) 
) DECREE OF DIVORCE 
P l a i n t i f f , ) 
v. ) 
THOMAS D. CHAMBERS, ) Civil No. 890901927 
) Judge Stanton M. Taylor 
Defendant, ) 
oooOooo 
The above-entitled matter came before the court, the 
Honorable Stanton M. Taylor presiding, for trial on August 28, 
August 29, August 30 and August 31, 1990. The plaintiff was 
present in person and represented by counsel David S. Dolowltz of 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C The defendant was present in person 
and represented by counsel Mark J. Roberts, Esquire of SMITH, & 
FEOLA, P. C. and Pete N. Vlabos of VLAHOS, SHARP & WIGHT. Prior to 
the commencement of trial, the parties presented to the court, a 
Stipulation to provide for the custody and visitation of the minor 
children of the parties which can be added to or changed by the 
mental health professionals with consent of the parties. 
The court then heard the parties and the witnesses on 
their behalf, reviewed the exhibits received into evidence, 
considered the arguments and proffers of counsel, heard the 
Stipulation into which the parties entered into in regard to their 
property in terms of valuation and distribution on August 31, 1990, 
and being thus advised in the premises, and having made and entered 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. This court has jurisdiction over the parties, the 
subject matter of this action and the minor children of the 
parties. 
2. Each of the parties is awarded a Decree of Divorce 
from the other terminating their marriage. The Decree of Divorce 
shall become final upon entry. 
3. Three (3) children have been born as issue of this 
marriage, to-wit: Erica, age 10, born July 12, 1980; Skyler, age 
7, born August 8, 1983; Megan, age 4, born April 21, 1986. 
4. The children shall reside with Erin Chambers and 
shall be under her day-to-day control. Parenting issues which 
require a decision by both Erin Chambers and Tom Chambers shall be 
effected only through Dr. Hilton and Dr. Sargent. 
5. The children shall visit with Tom Chambers as 
hereinafter set out. If any visit is not utilized as set out, it 
is lost and not made up. 
a. While Tom Chambers is in Utah and not engaged 
in his profession as a professional basketball 
player, he shall have the right to visit with 
the children every other weekend from Friday 
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at 5: 00 p. m. until Sunday at 7: 00 p. m. ; 
b. During the basketball season when Tom 
Chambers is practicing his profession as a 
professional basketball player, he shall be 
entitled to two weekend visits per month in 
Phoenix Arizona. These shall run from Friday 
after school until Sunday at 7: 00 p. m. by 
which time the children shall be at the Salt 
Lake International Airport to conclude the 
visit. ThoM» visits shall require a minimum 
of four days notice. If notice is not 
provided four days in advance, the visit shall 
not take place. The visit shall be at Tom 
Chamber' s expense and the children shall be 
accompanied by an adult while traveling to and 
from Salt Lake City and Phoenix; 
c. Tom Chambers shall be entitled to visit with 
the children for four days after Christmas and 
before New Year' s Eve during the Christmas 
vacation from school. The four days shall be 
designated by him no later than two weeks in 
advance or this visit shall not occur; 
d During the summer, Tom Chambers shall be 
entitled to two, two week visits upon 
providing a minimum of three weeks advance 
notice to Erin Chambers. That advance notice 
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shall specify the time and place he shall pick 
up the children and shall return the children; 
e. There may be visits on unanticipated/special 
occasions about which the parties mutually 
agree; 
f. Both parties shall use the other as "baby-
sitter of choice" when the party with whom the 
children are staying need short-term care. 
6, Tom Chambers shall engage in therapy with Dr. 
Clifford Hilton. This therapy is a condition of this Decree of 
Divorce, and if he does not follow through with the therapy, it 
shall be grounds for setting aside the child custody and visitation 
portions of this Decree of Divorce and bringing the matter back 
before the court. The therapy visits shall take place weekly in 
Ogden while Tom Chambers is in Utah during the off-season and 
regularly by telephone at Dr. Hilton' s discretion during the 
playing season. Erin Chambers shall pursue and comply with her 
current treatment plan or its equivalent. 
The children shall continue in therapy with Dr. Janice 
Sargent, who shall work with the minor children of the parties and 
Erin Chambers as is necessary to facilitate the communication issue 
and such other issues as Dr. Sargent and Dr. Hilton determine must 
be addressed in terms of working through a parent-child 
relationship between Erin Chambers and the children and Tom 
Chambers and the children. Tom Chambers shall pay any uninsured 
expenses of this therapy. 
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Each parent, Tom Chambers and Erin Chambers, shall not 
scrutinize the parenting actions of the other. This is a general 
admonition and when questions arise in their minds regarding the 
actions that the other has taken, these shall not be addressed to 
the children or to the other parent, but shall be addressed to Dr. 
Hilton and Dr. Sargent and shall be addressed by the parties only 
with the assistance of Dr. Hilton and Dr. Sargent. 
Each of the parents, Tom Chambers and Erin Chambers, are 
enjoined and prohibited from denigrating the other to the children 
or quizzing the children about any actions taken by the other 
during visitation or residence. Any such questions should be 
addressed to Dr. Hilton and Dr. Sargent. 
7. This matter shall come back before the court for 
further review either in one year or at the direction of the 
treating therapists, Dr. Hilton and Dr. Sargent should it be 
necessary prior to that time. 
8. Dr. Hilton and Dr. Sargent shall consult with 
each other, the parties and the children as they deem necessary to 
assist in resolution of the communication problems between the 
parties. All costs of their services not paid by insurance shall 
by paid by Tom Chambers. 
9. The defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff 
alimony in the sum of $10,000.00 per month for a period of three 
years commencing November 1, 1990. In November of 1993, the 
alimony award shall decrease to the sum of $5,000.00 per month 
which shall be paid for an additional three years subject to the 
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terms of the decree upon the payment of the alimony payment due in 
October of 1996, alimony shall cease. In the event that the 
plaintiff dies, remarries, or cohabits during the time that the 
alimony is being paid to her, it shall terminate. 
10. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff for the 
support and maintenance of the children of the minor parties the 
sum of $1, 500. 00 per month per child, for a total of $4, 500. 00 per 
month as child support. Said support to continue for each child 
until that child attains majority and graduates from high school 
with his or her regularly scheduled class provided however that the 
court shall retain jurisdiction to consider at the time that each 
of the older two (2) children attain majority whether the decrease 
in child support per child for the remaining children or child 
should be a full $1, 500. 00 per month at the time each child attains 
majority or a lesser sum under the then existing circumstances of 
the parties. It is acknowledged that defendant is paying child 
support in the amount of three (3) times higher than the maximum 
child support amount set forth by the child support schedule for 
three (3) children, and the higher amount is justified in allowing 
the children to share in the relative affluence of the defendant. 
11. The defendant shall maintain such health, accident 
and dental insurance as is available to him through his employment 
for the minor children of the parties, and shall pay all uninsured 
medical, dental, eye care and orthodontic expenses by or on behalf 
of the children. 
12. The defendant shall take all steps necessary to be 
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certain that the plaintiff is able to secure her COBRA benefits to 
health insurance from the NBA for insurance protection for 3 6 
months after the entry of this Decree. All such medical insurance 
premiums and expenses shall be paid by plaintiff. 
13. While there are substantial assets that are being 
distributed, it appears to the court that plaintiff is concerned 
about some kind of guaranteed future income. The defendant has 
secured retirement benefits through the NBA. These shall be 
divided between the parties by an appropriate, qualified, domestic 
relations order (QDRO) which shall be entered after this Decree of 
Divorce has been finalized and accepted by the court. If there is 
an immediate rollover available under the NBA plan that shall be 
effected. If r.-;-r RT • division of the defendant' s account is 
required tc ettect* by future distribution, it shall be divided 
according to the formula articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in 
the decision of Woodward vs. Woodward, P^tf P. 2d( 43 1 (Utah 1982) in 
which plaintiff would be entitled to one-half (1/2) of the pension 
proceeds accumulated during the years the parties wer married 
during the time the pension was being accumulated. 
14. The plaintiff is awarded all of the furniture, 
fixtures, furnishings and appliances located in the North Ogden 
home in which she resides with her children at the time of trial. 
15. The defendant is awarded all of the furniture, 
fixtures, furnishings and appliances located in the home he is 
renting in Phoenix, the condomini urn i n Eden, Utah and the cabin. 
T n. addition, he is awarded the bookends and Bev Doolittle book 
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which are presently in the possession of the plaintiff. 
16. Each of the parties is ordered to make available the 
home videos and pictures which they have in their possession for 
copying by the other. 
17. The plaintiff is awarded the 11. 4% Washington State 
bonds, her checking account in Zions National Bank, the obligation 
from Ray Ward for $100,000.00, the obligation from Scott and Kerry 
Hall of $6,000.00, the Jeep Cherokee she is driving, the 1986 
Chaparelle boat valued at $5,000.00 and one-half of the All Terrain 
vehicles. 
18. The defendant is awarded his First Interstate bank 
account, his Zions First National Bank account, the leasehold 
improvements on his Phoenix home, the land in Pleasant View, Utah, 
the 200 acre parcel of mountain property, the approximately 95 
acres of mountain property, the North Ogden horse property, the 
Mercedes-Benz automobile, the CJ-7 Jeep, one-half of the All 
Terrain vehicles, the four-horse trailer, the three-horse trailer, 
the All Terrain vehicle trailer, the GMC pickup truck, the tractor, 
the horses and mules, the interest in the race horse and the cabin 
and property of the parties. 
19. To equalize the division of property between the 
parties, the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the sum of 
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$377,892.00 [which includes the payments described in paragraphs 22 
and 23(e)] from his one-half of the annuities or their proceeds if 
those must be cashed in upon receipt of those funds. This payment 
is governed by §1041 of the Internal Revenue Code. 
20. The defendant has earned compensation from Seattle 
Supersonics, for which he has provided all of his services which 
compensation has been deferred. These payments are due in February 
of 1991, February of 1992 and February of 199 3 These payments 
shall be divided equally between the parties. If, under Washington 
community property law, each of the parties may be paid one-half of 
these payments and the tax consequences of those payments borne by 
the party receiving those monies, then they shall be paid 
accordingly and this Decree specifically adopts and applies that 
Washington State Community Property law. If, however, under 
Washington State Community Property Law, these deferred payments 
are considered payment to the defendant and are earned income by 
him, he shall pay one-half of the gross proceeds of each payment to 
the plaintiff. This shall be considered for tax purposes, a § 71 
(IRC) alimony payment. It shall be tax deductible to the defendant 
and taxable income in t lie plaintiff. This alimony provision shall 
he non-modifiable. If these payments, for any reason cannot be 
treated as set forth above and taxed to the recipient as described, 
then the defendant shall pay the taxes that are due on these 
payments, then pay one-half of the proceeds after the appropriate 
tax payments have been made to the plaintiff and the receipt by the 
plaintiff of these funds shall be considered a § 1041 (IRC) 
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Property Distribution. 
21. The defendant shall receive payments of $133,333.00 
in the month of September of 1990 and the month of October, 1990 
from the Phoenix Suns. The defendant shall pay the regular 
withholding taxes from these sums at the same rate that he has paid 
for the preceding months of 1990. After those taxes have been 
withheld, the net sum remaining which the parties believe will be 
approximately $80,000.00, is to be paid one-half to each party upon 
receipt of those funds by the Defendant. The Plaintiff s receipt 
of her one-half of these funds shall be as a § 1041 (IRC) Property 
Distribution. Plaintiff acknowledges receipt of these payments. 
22. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff $115,000.00 
in October of 1990 as a § 1041 (IRC) property distribution as 
settlement of her claim for dissipation of the marital estate and 
celebrity good will, fame and publicity, defendant' s contract 
extension value, if any, promotional and complimentary items and 
basketball camps. This payment shall be made upon receipt of the 
annuity or funds from the annuities by the Defendant as described 
in paragraph 23(e) herein. 
23. The following property shall be divided equally 
between the parties upon receipt or as soon as possible. 
a. The payment due on the Nike contract of 
$5, 000. 00 after deduction by the defendant of 
the regular income tax withholding from that 
payment. That portion of this payment paid to 
the Plaintiff shall be considered a § 1041 
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(IRC) Division of Property. 
b. The proceeds from the sale of the Bucklin 
Trust. The parties agree to divide equally 
the liabilities relating thereto. 
c. The debt due on the Hall Woodway Investment 
($43, 125. 00)and all expenses and liabilities 
relating thereto and the Hall Woodway 
Investment itself. 
d. The proceeds, liabilities and expenses 
resulting from tiitj Crenshaw loan/investment. 
e. The $840,000.00 approximate gross worth of 
annuities due in October of 1'MM) from the 
Seattle Superbunics, provided if these can be 
divided equally so that each of the parties 
receives one-half and eacl .if f hi. parties may 
deal th their own tax consequences under the 
State of Washington' s Community Property I.HW, 
that shall be effected; i i not, then the 
defendant shall have withheld his regular tax, 
his regular withholding tax on these annuities 
or payments and the annuities received, shall 
divided equally between the parties, 
provided, however, on receipt the 
annuities, the defendant shall pay the 
plaintiff's one-half (1/2) and then pay to 
plaintiff the $115,000.00 described ritinve to 
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be considered a § 1041 (IRC) distribution of 
property to her. 
On receipt of the annuities or funds by 
the defendant and after payment to the 
plaintiff of her one-half of these annuities 
or funds, defendant shall immediately make 
payment to plaintiff of the $115,000.00 
hereinabove described under paragraph 23 which 
sum is included in the $377,892.00 described 
in paragraph 19 above, 
f. The home in North Ogden, Utah and the 
condominium in Eden, Utah, shall be sold as 
soon as practical and the net proceeds of sale 
divided between the parties. The parties 
shall mutually agree upon a sales agent and 
shall hold title in both properties as tenants 
in common. Pending the sale of the Ogden home 
and Eden condominium, defendant will pay the 
mortgage, taxes, insurance, repairs, 
maintenance and homeowner7 s association fees 
relating thereto subject to the following 
conditions: With respect to the home in 
Ogden, Utah one-half (1/2) of all net 
proceeds, if any, will be distributed to the 
parties after all costs of sale have been 
deducted and defendant is reimbursed for all 
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expenses incurred relating to the house paid 
by the defendant up to the total proceeds. If 
the property is rented, there will be an 
appropriate credit for the amount of rent 
received until the property is sold. With 
respect to the condominium in Eden, Utah, one-
half (1/2) of all the proceeds will be 
distributed to the parties after all costs of 
sale have been deducted and defendant has been 
reimbursed for all principal reductions made 
by virtue of defendant' s payments relating to 
the condominium from and after August 31, 
1990. 
The plaintiff and defendant each shall receive 
one (1) share in the houseboat. The1 plaintiff 
shall receive the 1986 Chaparelle boat valued 
at $5, 000. 00. 
The proceeds from the Life USA annuity. 
The BulJgei Basin investment and all expenses 
and disclosed liabilities relating thereto. 
The Players Athletic investment and all 
expenses and liabilities disclosed prior to 
August 31, 1990 relating thereto. 
The Triaxel stock and a)\ expenses and 
liabilities relating thereto disclosed prior 
to August 31, 1990. 
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24. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the sum of 
$10,000.00 to assist her in payment of her attorney's fees. If 
this sum is paid within thirty-five days, this obligation shall be 
satisfied. If not, upon the filing by the plaintiff of an 
affidavit stating that these have not been paid, then judgment is 
hereby entered automatically by operation of the filing of that 
affidavit in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for 
the sum of $10,000.00. 
25. As properties which are divided are in the name of 
and under the control of the defendant prior to their division, the 
defendant shall have the duty and he is ordered to give plaintiff 
names, telephone numbers and addresses of contact people on all 
properties awarded to plaintiff. 
26. All joint credit card/charge accounts shall be 
closed and charges incurred shall be the responsibility of the 
party incurring the charge. 
27. If the defendant becomes delinquent in his child 
support obligation in an amount at least equal to child support 
payable for one month, then the plaintiff is entitled to mandatory 
income withholding relief, pursuant to section 30-3-5-1 and 62A-11-
403 (1953) as amended). This income withholding procedure shall 
apply to existing and future payors until such time as the 
defendant is no longer obligated to pay child support to the 
plaintiff. 
28. Each party is ordered to take all actions required 
to implement the terms of this Decree of Divorce and to cooperate 
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with the other in signing all deeds and documents necessary to 
implement this Decree. Should any action be required to enforce 
the provisions of this Decree of Divorce, the party determined to 
have failed or refused to have complied with the provisions of the 
Decree of Divorce shall be assessed and required to pay the costs 
and attorney fees incurred in securing compliance with the Decree 
of Divorce. 
DATED this j / / day of / / ^ ^ , 1990. 
BY THE 
Third Di 
APPROVED AS REFLECTING THE 
RULING OF THE COURT: 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
MARK ROBENS 
Attorney-) for Defendant 
^PEftER VI£ 
A t t o r n e y f o r Defendant 
STATE OF UTAH I 
COUNTY OF WEBER f St 
£> 
OfTh.Oriiin»IOn^ifeinMyOffic5 , t 
DATEDTH,S 4 ^ ! & Q ^ j Q ^ , ^ 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ERIN JO CHAMBERS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
THOMAS CHAMBERS 
Defendants. 
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded this case to this 
court outlining three areas for the court's reconsideration. Those 
three areas were alimony, division of retirement and an award of 
attorneys fees. 
In this case there is no question that in considering the 
preferences established in Woodward (656 P2d 431), the facts would 
favor a present division of the retirement because the present 
value is determinable and there are sufficient assets in the estate 
to allow such a division. I have personally felt that there should 
be a strong preference favoring a division which would assure a 
non-working spouse with a secure independent retirement income. 
However I defer to the wisdom and law established by "Woodward" and 
award the Defendant his retirement upon payment by him of one half 
its present value ($32,379.46) to the Plaintiff. In addition, in 
the past there have been enhancements to the plan having 
retroactive effect. If there are enhancements taking effect after 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 890901927 
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the time of the trial of this matter, then the Plaintiff shall be 
entitled to her share of that enhancement based upon the Woodward 
formula. 
In reconsidering the alimony award in the original decree, it 
occurs to me that there were miscalculations. I found that 
Plaintiff's exhibit 11 correctly reflected the needs of the 
Plaintiff and her children at about $10,000 per month. That amount 
fails to consider her additional need of health and accident 
insurance (previously provided by the Defendant) and money to 
offset her tax liability for her receipt of alimony. I recognized 
that there were substantial children's expenses involved in the 
exhibit 11 needs assessment, but felt that expense would be: 
approximately offset by the fact that the child support nearly 
equaled the amount of children's' expense alleged on exhibit 11 and 
the $4500 child support was included in the income calculations. 
In recalculating the alimony, if we accept the expenses of 
exhibit 11 and add the expense of health and accident insurance and 
taxes on the alimony paid, and then deduct the child support^ that 
means the Plaintiff has need of about $7000 to maintain her prior 
standard of living. 
This ruling does not factor in any consideration of the 
Plaintiff's ability to provide for herself or money received as 
returns on investments from assets awarded as a part of the 
Erin Jo Chambers vs. Thomas Chambers 
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property division. It is the intent of the court that the 
Plaintiff should have the initial three years as a rehabilitative 
period to: marshall her assets, learn to invest appropriately, 
make decisions about her future, prepare for future employment, 
become settled, etc. Thereafter the court adopts as its finding, 
paragraphs 10 and 11 from the Defendant's Supplemental Findings of 
Fact, etc. relating to the Plaintiff's ability to care for herself, 
and based upon that finding imputes income to the Plaintiff of 
$736 per month. 
The Plaintiff received as her share of the property division 
$1,479,578. Realistically it would not be fair to consider that: 
figure as her investment base. There are obviously attorneys' fees 
and costs of the proceeding as well as taxes to pay, etc. She has 
also requested that we deduct from her investment base her purchase 
of a home and the debt by her family. It would not be appropriate 
to allow the Plaintiff to remove the home from her investment base 
and also allow her to claim rent expense of over $1000 per month. 
Figuring a 4% return on her investment base, the imputed 
income of $736, and the child support, the alimony award should be 
reduced at the end of three years to $3000 per month. 
I had previously ordered termination of alimony at the end of 
three years. That decision was based on the fact that when the 
Defendant is through with basketball his ability to produce income 
Chambers v. Chambers 
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is frankly no better than the Plaintiffs. His present earning 
ability is based strictly upon his status^a professional athlete. 
In retrospect that is not entirely correct, for it fails to 
consider the income he will earn in the meantime. His 
investmentbase, considering his interim income, should exceed hers 
by several times, giving him by far a superior ability to provide 
on-going assistance. 
The alimony then should not terminate except upon the 
occurrence of remarriage, death etc. 
The final issue requiring consideration is that of the 
attorneys' fee award. The stipulation at trial, as the court 
understood it, was that if Mr. Dolowitz were called to testify, he 
would verify the material contained in Plaintiff's exhibit 17 ai.d 
express the opinion that the time and costs involved were 
reasonable taking into account the complexity and seriousness of 
the issues involved. The Defendant did not stipulate the charges 
or time were reasonable, but only that would be Mr. Dolowitz fs 
testimony. 
The exhibit (17) contained a summary sheet of the gross 
charges, a breakdown of the hourly rate of persons from Mi . 
Dolowitz's office working upon the Plaintiff's case, a monthly 
summary of charges, times, and persons, and finally a day-by-day 
account of date, attorney, service description, hours and charge 
^ -
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(amount). In considering the complexity of the issues, the number 
of hearings, the conferences, the resolution of issues, the 
animosity between the parties, the amounts of money and property, 
etc., the court believes the charges were not unreasonable. 
The second issue relates to the fact that the Defendant with 
a multiple Million Dollar income clearly has the ability to assist 
the Plaintiff with her attorneys fees. In fact in a comparison of 
the resources of the two parties he is in a much superior position. 
The final prong of the "Bell" (810 P2d 489) analysis relates 
to the ability of the Plaintiff to pay her own attorneys1 fees. 
It is clear with the distribution of almost a million and a half 
dollars in assets, that the Plaintiff could pay her own attorney. 
However the court was concerned about the necessity of her being 
able to maintain an appropriate investment base. I was aware that 
there would be substantial inroads into that base by reason of 
taxes, the debt owed by her family (which is likely uncollectible), 
court costs, witness' fees , attorneys' fees, etc. In the interest 
of her being able to maintain a base sufficient to provide an 
appropriate income, I felt she needed some assistance with the 
fees. I ruled the attorneys1 fees previously paid, have been paid 
with marital assets not to be considered in the final distribution, 
and awarded her an additional $10,000 to apply to her attorneys' 
fees. Based upon the above considerations I find that the 
i o O 
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Plaintiff has need of assistance with her attorneys1 fees. 
I have referred above to the debt to her family, which is 
probably not collectable. There was some dispute at trial about 
whose idea the loan was and to whom it should be assigned. 
Iawarded it to the Plaintiff because it was to her family and 
because I believed that she had some influence in the decision 
process. There is likewise no question that the Defendant also had 
some responsibility for that decision. While it is not my intent 
to revisit that issue, I think it appropriate to point out that the 
reduction in her investment base was contributed to by that 
obligation and that is an equitable factor considered by the court. 
Dated this C/ of July, 1993. 
couwrrOF 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ERIN JO CHAMBERS, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
THOMAS D. CHAMBERS, 
Defendant. ] 
| SUPPLEMENTAL | MEMORANDUM 
! NOV 1 9 jccj 
i Case No. 890901927 
In the courts reconsideration of alimony in response to 
an order of the appellate court, I had failed to specify 
disposition of the overpayment from the time of the original decree 
to the time of the order of the Court of Appeals. 
Upon reflection, that failure may have been a result of 
a subconscience desire to not address the issue in hopes it would 
go away. 
To require the Plaintiff to repay those overpayments 
would seriously affect her ability to maintain her standard of 
living. 
It would undermine further her investment base to a very 
serious extent. In addition, in dividing the estate, we had 
awarded to her an obligation of her family which at this point 
seems unlikely to be collected. The decision to loan the money to 
the plaintiff's brother appears to have been a joint decision. The 
t ^0 
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diminution of her estate by both the loan and repayment of alimony 
based upon the courts mistake, somehow seems unfair. 
The Court accordingly declines to order repayment based 
upon the equities of property division, earning ability, etc. 
w
 I hereby certify that on the f^r^ day of November, 1993, 
I sent a true and correct copy of the foregoing Supplemental 
Memorandum to counsel as follows: 
Mark J. Robens, Esq. 
MARISCAL, WEEKS, McINTYRE 
& FRIEDLANDER 
201 West Coolidge Street 
Phoenix, AZ 85013 
Brian R. Florence 
FLORENCE AND HUTCHISON 
818 26th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Pete N. Vlahos 
VLAHOS, SHARP & WIGHT 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
• W ^ J l 
Brian R. Florence #1091 
of FLORENCE AND HUTCHISON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
818-26th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
399-9291 - / FAX 399-9333 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
vH 
ERIN JO CHAMBERS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS D. CHAMBERS, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER ON REMAND *i K£ 2 
Civil No. 890901927 
Hon. Stanton M. Taylor 
BACKGROUND 
On October 21, 1992, the Utah Court of Appeals filed 
its decision on the earlier appeal of this case. See 
Chambers v. Chambers, 198 U.A.R. 49 (Utah App. 1992). 
After remand, the matter was placed on the Court's 
calendar for a scheduling conference for January 19, 1993. 
The parties, through their respective counsel, appeared 
before the Court on that day, at which time the defendant, 
through his counsel, filed with the Court a Memorandum on 
Remand and proposed Supplemental Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro 
Tunc. Defendant's Memorandum contended that sufficient 
evidence existed in the record to support supplemental 
Findings, Conclusions and Amended Decree of Divorce and that 
no further hearing should be necessary. 
The Court gave plaintiff additional time to respond to 
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defendant's Memorandum and provisionally scheduled the matter 
for trial on June 24, 1993. 
On February 17, 1993f the plaintiff, through her 
counsel, filed a Response to Memorandum and thereafter the 
Court scheduled a hearing for argument which was held 
June 7, 1993. The parties, through their respective counsel, 
presented their positions. At the conclusion of the hearing, 
the Court announced that it felt sufficient facts existed in 
the record to permit the Court to supplement its findings in 
conformance with the directions of the Court of Appeals, 
canceled the trial date and took the matter under advisement. 
On July 9, 1993, the Court issued its Memorandum 
Decision. 
On July 13, 1993, the plaintiff, through her counsel, 
asked the Court for some further clarification with respect 
to its decision, which clarification was provided by letter 
from the Court dated July 16, 1993. 
On September 15, 1993, the parties' counsel met with 
the Court requesting additional clarification regarding the 
effective date of the reduction of alimony. The Court took 
that matter under further advisement and issued its 
Supplemental Memorandum on November 19, 1993. 
With this background, the Court now enters the 
following: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded this 
case to this Court outlining three areas for the Court's 
reconsideration. Those three areas were alimony, division of 
retirement and an award of attorney fees. 
2. In this case, there is no question that in 
considering the preferences established in Woodward v. 
Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), the facts would favor a 
present division of the retirement because the present value 
is determinable and there are sufficient assets in the estate 
to allow such a division. The Court has personally felt that 
there should be a strong preference favoring a division which 
would assure a non-working spouse with a secure independent 
retirement income, but the Court defers to the wisdom and law 
established by Woodward. 
3. In reconsidering the alimony award in the original 
Decree, it occurs that there were miscalculations. 
4. Plaintiff's Exhibit 11 correctly reflected the 
needs of the plaintiff and her children at about $10,000.00 
per month. That amount failed to consider her additional 
need of health and accident insurance (previously provided by 
the defendant) and money to offset her tax liability for her 
receipt of alimony. 
5. The Court recognized there were substantial 
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children's expenses involved in the Exhibit 11 needs 
assessment, but those expenses would be approximately offset 
by the fact that the child support nearly equalled the amount 
of children's expense alleged on Exhibit 11 and the $4,500.00 
child support was included in the income calculations. 
6. In recalculating the alimony, if the Court accepts 
the expenses of Exhibit 11 and adds the expenses of health 
and accident insurance and taxes on the alimony paid and then 
deducts the child support, that means the plaintiff has need 
of about $7,000.00 to maintain her prior standard of living. 
7. The estimated $7,000.00 for the plaintiff to 
maintain her prior standard of living does not factor into 
any consideration of the plaintiff's ability to provide for 
herself or money received as returns on investments from 
assets awarded to her as part of the property division. 
8. It was the intent of the Court that the plaintiff 
should have the initial three years as a rehabilitative 
period to: 
A. Martial her assets; 
B. Learn to invest appropriately; 
C. Make decisions about her future; 
D. Prepare for future employment; 
E. Become settled, etc. 
9. In the Court's reconsideration of alimony in the 
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Memorandum Decision issued July 9, 1993, the Court failed to 
specify the disposition of the over-payment of alimony from 
the time of the original Decree to the Order of the Court of 
Appeals. Upon reflection, that failure may have been a 
result of a subconscious desire to not address the issues in 
hopes it would go away. To require the plaintiff to repay 
those over-payments would seriously affect her ability to 
maintain her standard of living. It would undermine further 
her investment base to a very serious extent. In addition, 
in dividing the estate, we had awarded to her an obligation 
of her family which at this point seems unlikely to be 
collected. The decision to loan the money to plaintiff's 
brother appears to have been a joint decision. The 
diminution of her estate by both the loan and repayment of 
alimony based on the Court's mistake, somehow seems unfair. 
10. Plaintiff was thirty years of age at the time of 
trial. She testified that she had two and one-half years of 
college and that she held certain jobs previously, including 
teaching dancing, working in window display and as a clerk at 
ZCMI and a clerk at Stop & Shop. She also testified she 
helped manage some apartments. Plaintiff also testified that 
she had not made any attempts to obtain any employment 
outside of the house. The evidence also showed that 
plaintiff participated in many types of physical activities 
%.- «w o 
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and there were no reasons, health or otherwise, why plaintiff 
could not be fully employed and contribute to her own needs. 
Plaintiff could have found appropriate employment which would 
provide at least a minimum wage income of $736.00 to assist 
in providing her own needs. 
11. The plaintiff received as her share of the 
property division $1,479,578.00. Realistically, it would not 
be fair to consider that figure as her investment base. 
There were obviously attorney fees and costs of the 
proceeding, as well as taxes to pay, etc. The plaintiff has 
requested that we deduct from her investment base her 
purchase of a home and the debt to her from her family. 
12. It would not be appropriate to allow the plaintiff 
to remove the home from her investment base and also allow 
her to claim rent expense of over $1,000.00 per month. 
13. The Court figures with a four percent return on 
her investment base, the imputed income of $736.00 and the 
child support, the alimony should be reduced at the end of 
three years to $3,000.00 per month. 
14. The Court previously ordered the alimony to be 
terminated at the end of six years. That decision was based 
on the fact that when the defendant was through with 
basketball, his ability to produce income is frankly no 
better than the plaintiffs and his present earning ability is 
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based strictly upon his status as a professional athlete. 
15. In retrospect, that is not entirely correct or it 
fails to consider the income he will earn in the meantime. 
His investment base, considering his interim income, should 
exceed the plaintiff's by several times, giving him by far a 
superior ability to provide on-going assistance. 
16. The final issue requiring consideration is that of 
the attorney fee award. The stipulation at trial, as the 
Court understood it, was that if Mr. Dolowitz were called to 
testify, he would verify the material contained in 
plaintiff's Exhibit 17 and express the opinion that the time 
and costs involved were reasonable taking into account the 
complexity and seriousness of the issues involved. The 
defendant did not stipulate the charges or time were 
reasonable, but only that Mr. Dolowitz would testify 
accordingly. 
17. Plaintiff's Exhibit 17 contained a summary sheet 
of the gross charges, a breakdown of the hourly rate of 
persons from Mr. Dolowitz's office working on the plaintiff's 
case, a monthly summary of charges, times and persons and 
finally a day-by-day account of date, attorney, service 
description, hours and charge. 
18. In considering the complexity of issues, the 
number of hearings, the conferences, the resolution of 
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issues, the animosity between the parties, the amounts of 
money and property, the Court believes the attorney fee 
charges were not unreasonable. 
19. An additional issue relating to attorney fees is 
the fact that the defendant with a multi-million dollar 
income clearly has the ability to assist the plaintiff with 
her attorney fees and in comparison of the resources of the 
two parties, he is in a much superior position. 
20. The final prong of the test established in Bell v. 
Bell, 810 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1991) relates to the ability of 
the plaintiff to pay her own attorney fees. It is clear with 
the distribution of almost a million and one-half dollars in 
assets, the plaintiff could pay her own attorney. However, 
the Court was concerned about the necessity of her being able 
to maintain an appropriate investment base. The Court was 
aware that there would be substantial inroad into that base 
by reason of taxes, the debt owed by her family which is 
likely uncollectible, court costs, witness fees, attorney 
fees, etc. 
21. In the interest of the plaintiff being able to 
maintain a base sufficient to provide an appropriate income, 
she has need of some assistance with her attorney fees. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
1. The defendant is awarded all of his NBA or 
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basketball related retirements subject to paying the 
plaintiff one-half of the value in existence at the time of 
the original divorce trial. The value of the NBA Players 
Pension Plan presented at the time of trial was $64,758.92, 
one-half of which would belong to the plaintiff ($32,379.46) . 
2. In addition, in the past there have been 
enhancements to the plan having retroactive effect. If 
enhancements have occurred since the time of the trial of 
this matter, plaintiff shall be entitled to her share of any 
such enhancements based on the Woodward formula. This shall 
apply to any retirements existing at the time of the trial of 
this matter. 
3. A minimum wage income of $736.00 per month should 
be imputed to the plaintiff. 
4. Based on the findings concerning the plaintiff's 
return on her investment base, her imputed income as stated 
above and the child support previously stipulated to and 
ordered, plaintiff's alimony should be reduced to $7,000.00 
per month effective with the Court's Memorandum Decision 
dated July 12, 1993, which shall continue for the balance of 
the three-year rehabilitative period, after which the alimony 
should be reduced to $3,000.00 per month. 
5. The alimony awarded herein should only terminate 
upon the occurrence of remarriage, death or operation of law. 
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6. Based on the findings above and the standards 
established in Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1991), 
the $10,000.00 attorney fee award made at the time of trial 
is hereby affirmed. 
ORDER 
The Court having issued its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, hereby enters the following order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant be and he is hereby 
awarded all of his NBA or basketball related retirements 
subject to paying the plaintiff one-half of the value in 
existence at the time of the original divorce trial. The 
value of the NBA Players Pension Plan presented at the time 
of trial was $64,758.92, one-half of which would belong to 
the plaintiff ($32,379.46). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in addition, in the past 
there have been enhancements to the plan having retroactive 
effect. If enhancements have occurred since the time of the 
trial of this matter, plaintiff shall be entitled to her 
share of any such enhancements based on the Woodward formula. 
This shall apply to any retirements existing at the time of 
the trial of this matter. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a minimum wage income of 
$736.00 per month shall be imputed to the plaintiff. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that based on the findings 
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concerning the plaintiff's return on her investment base, her 
imputed income as stated above and the child support 
previously stipulated to and ordered, plaintiffs alimony 
shall be reduced to $7,000.00 per month effective with the 
Court's Memorandum Decision dated July 12, 1993, which shall 
continue for the balance of the three-year rehabilitative 
period, after which the alimony shall be reduced to $3,000.00 
per month. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the alimony awarded herein 
shall only terminate upon the occurrence of remarriage, death 
or operation of law. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that based on the findings above 
and the standards established in Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489 
(Utah App. 1991), the $10,000.00 attorney fee award made at 
the time of trial is hereby affirmed. 
Is p/ day of March, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF 
TO DEFENDANT ABOVE-NAMED AND HIS COUNSEL: 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial 
Administration, you are hereby notified that the undersigned 
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will hold the original hereof for a period of five days from 
the date this notice is mailed to you to allow you sufficient 
time to file any written objections to the form of the 
foregoing with the Court and mail a copy to the undersigned. 
If no objections to the form are filed within that time, the 
original hereof will be submitted to the Court for signature 
and filing.
 t/ 
DATED th3.s,-?Cl day of January, 1994. 
FLORENCE AND HUTCHISON 
BRIAN R. FLORENCE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
818-26th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order on Remand, postage prepaid, to the following at the 
addresses listed on this /<^J—""day of January, 1994. 
Pete N. Vlahos 
Attorney for Defendant 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Mark J. Robens 
Attorney for Defendant 
2901 N. Central Avenue #200 
Phoenix, AZ 
EILEEN CHRISTEMSEN. Secretaxy--^ 
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PLAINTIFF' S PROPOSED SUPPORT 
ny 
1. 
2. 
Living Expenses 
Taxes due 
(on $10, 000/mo) 
$9, 997. 73 
4, 060. 60 
$14,060.00 
1) See attached schedule 
2) 3 children as deductions 
3) w/o 3 children - $4,261.70 
(mcb/dsd/Chambers. ProStt) 
SUMMARY PROJECTED MONTHLY EXPENSES 
DATE: August 28 , 1990 
Rent and Household 
Children - Included on Plaintiff' 8 Schedule 
Charge Cards, Covering Expenses for: 
Clothing 
Entertainment 
Incidentals Expenses 
Food and Supplies 
Health Costs 
Laundry 
Utilities 
Insurance 
Trans porta ti on 
Entertainment 
Incidentals (see list attached) 
TOTAL PROJECTED MONTHLY EXPENSES: 
$1,493. 47 
855. 00 
3, 539. 55 
850. 
736. 
225. 
571. 
54. 
297. 
300. 
00 
20 
00 
25 
75 
51 
00 
SI075. 00 
S9
- "
7
-
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CHAMBERS Y. CHAMBERS 
PTiATNnFF* S MONTHLY EXPENSES 
DATE: August 28, 1990 
RENT AND HOUSEHOLD: * 
Rent/Mart gage 
Insurance (1/12) 
Property Taxes (1/12) 
Repairs 
Maintenance /Yard Care 
Mai d/Cl eani n g 
Subtotal: 
$1* 
£_. 
$1, 
020. 
26. 
114. 
50. 
48. 
- £ M L 
,493. 
00 
50 
97 
00 
00 
M 
47 
CHARGE CARDS: 
Zions - VISA 
Bank of America 
Nordstrom 
Weinstocks 
zcm 
Subtotal: 
$1, 000. 00 
564. 55 
1,576. 00 
100. 00 
S 300. 00 
$3, 539. 55 
FOOD AND SUPPLIES: 
At Home $600. 00 
Eating Out &2SSLJ1SL 
Subtotal: $850.00 
HEALTH COSTS fPlaintiff and Children): 
(Defendant has health insurance -
Bills submitted - non-covered expenses 
unknown) 
Doctor $366. 00 
Dentist 50. 00 
Drugs /Prescription 100. 00 
Children S220.20 
Subtotal: $736.20 
*Plaintiff is planning to move - expenses may differ 
somewhat. 
LAUNDRY: 
Laundry $25. 00 
Dry Cleaning $200. 00 
Subtotal: $225. 00 
SniMXUSS: 
Telephone $400. 00 
Gas 70. 00 
Electric 75. 00 
Water & Sewer; Garbage Collection 
(North Ogden City) £ 26. 25 
Subtotal: $571.25 
INSURANCE: 
Auto $54. 75 
Medical and Hospital (Paid by Tom) ? 
Life ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Subtotal: $54. 75 
TRANSPORTATION: 
Car Payments 
Gas and Oil $130. 00 
Repairs 50. 00 
License and Tax 37. 51 
Car Wash & 80. 00 
Subtotal: $297. 51 
1Plaintiff would like Defendant to be ordered to continue to 
pay all health insurance premiums and expenses not covered by 
insurance because of Plaintiff's current medical condition. 
OTHER: 
$40. 
500. 
200. 
40. 
$ 75. 
00 
00 
00 
00 
jm 
Income Tax Preparation (Paid by Tom) ? 
Entertainment (additional expenses included 
in charge card expenses (Traveling) £300. 00 
Subtotal: $300. 00 
CHILDREN* S EXPENSES: 
Books, Reading Material 
Child Care 
Lessons, Costumes, Swimming, Baseball, Soccer 
Pre-School (Megan) 
School Lunches 
Subtotal: $855. 00 
INCIDENTALS: 
Hair and Beauty Care $125. 00 
Subscriptions (Books, Magazines, Newspapers) 25. 00 
Pets 75. 00 
Church or Synagogue (10% of earnings) 650. 00 
Gifts 100. 00 
Hobbies (needlepoint, etc) & 100. 00 
Subtotal: $1, 075. 00 
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